This paper studies the link between volatility, labor market ‡exibility, and international trade. International di¤erences in the ‡exibility with which labor market regulation enables …rms to adjust to idiosyncratic shocks are a source of comparative advantage if the withinindustry dispersion of shocks is di¤erent across industries. Other things equal, countries with more ‡exible labor markets specialize in industries with high volatility. Empirical evidence for a large sample of countries supports our theory: the exports of countries with more ‡exible labor markets are biased towards high-volatility industries.
Introduction
Comparative advantage is usually attributed to international di¤erences in production capabilities stricto senso. The Ricardian model, for example, stresses the importance of technology for explaining why countries trade, whereas the Heckscher-Ohlin model emphasizes international di¤erences in relative factor endowments. But institutional di¤erences can give way to comparative advantage, too, even when technologies and relative factor endowments are identical across countries.
In particular, this paper studies the role of labor market ‡exibility as a source of comparative advantage.
Cross-country di¤erences in labor market ‡exibility -as with other measures of institutional di¤erences -are correlated with country income levels. Nevertheless, substantial di¤erences in labor market ‡exibility persist within groups of countries with similar income levels. Within the OECD, for example, North-America, the British Isles and Oceania have much more ‡exible labor markets than most of continental Europe. Table 1 illustrates these di¤erences within income groups using an index of labor market ‡exibility constructed by the World Bank. 1 These institutional di¤erences are associated with important cross-country di¤erences in the ‡ows of workers between employment and unemployment and, more importantly for our purposes, across jobs. Table 2 , taken from Blanchard and Portugal (2001), compares job ‡ows in the US, a very ‡exible country, and Portugal, a very rigid one. 2 Although the American and Portuguese unemployment rates were similar during the early 90s, the Portuguese labor market exhibited much smaller ‡ows of workers across di¤erent jobs.
Worker ‡ows vary importantly also across industries. Table 3 , taken from Davis et al. (1997) , displays average annual excess job reallocation rates (as a percentage of employment) by fourdigit (US SIC) manufacturing industry in the US. Excess job reallocation re ‡ects simultaneous job creation and destruction within industries. It represents the "excess" portion of job reallocationover and above the amount required to accommodate net industry employment changes. Table 3 shows that the within-industry reallocation process exhibits a remarkable degree of cross-industry variation. Clearly, this variation cannot be attributed to di¤erences in labor market regulation. We interpret this cross-industry variation as re ‡ecting di¤erences in the needed …rm-level adjustments 1 We discuss this index in detail in Section 4. 2 Job creation at time t equals employment gains summed over all plants that expand or start up between t 1 and t. Job destruction at time t equals employment losses summed over all plants that contract or shut down between t 1 and t. Net employment growth equals the job creation rate minus the job destruction rate. Job reallocation at time t is the sum of job creation and job destruction. Excess job reallocation equals the di¤erence between job reallocation and the absolute value of net employment change.
to idiosyncratic demand and productivity shocks: a higher within-industry dispersion of shocks entails a larger response in the within-industry reallocation of employment between …rms.
We formalize a theory of comparative advantage in this context. For simplicity, we frame our insights within a one-factor model of trade between two countries with di¤erent labor market institutions (a ' ‡exible'and 'rigid'economy). These di¤erences interact with industry-level di¤erences in the dispersion of …rm-level shocks to generate industry-level di¤erences in relative productivity, and hence a 'Ricardian' source of comparative advantage. Again for simplicity, we do not model any technological di¤erences between countries. Thus, in the absence of shocks, di¤erences in labor market ‡exibility are irrelevant. There is then no source of comparative advantage, and no motive for trade. However, in the presence of …rm-level shocks, the country with ‡exible labor markets can reallocate labor across …rms more easily -leading to higher industry average productivity levels relative to the country with rigid labor markets. This productivity di¤erence is then magni…ed by the dispersion of the within-industry shocks, which we refer to as industry volatility. The latter thus interacts with the institutional labor market di¤erences to induce a pattern of comparative advantage across industries.
We also extend our model to incorporate a second factor, capital, whose reallocation across …rms is not a¤ected by the labor market institutions. Provided that this reallocation of capital across …rms is subject to the same degree of rigidity in both countries, then the pattern of comparative advantage driven by industry volatility becomes more muted for capital intensive industries. In other words, rigid countries face less of a comparative disadvantage in capital intensive industries -holding industry volatility constant. Thus our model also explains how capital intensity can a¤ect comparative advantage based on di¤erences in labor market institutions -separately from the standard Hecksher-Ohlin e¤ect via interactions with a country's capital abundance.
Besides these implications on comparative advantage, our model also yields interesting insights on the relationship between trade and unemployment in countries that su¤er from important rigidities in their labor markets: trade with a ‡exible country imposes a trade-o¤ between the wage rate (relative to that of the ‡exible economy) and its employment level. As the rigid economy's relative wage rises, the range of sectors in which it is competitive shrinks due to foreign competition, and labor demand falls. This trade-o¤ worsens with increases in labor market rigidity and with across-the-board (cross-industry) increases in volatility, as both of these phenomena enhance the ‡exible economy's competitiveness relative to the rigid economy. This e¤ect of overall increases in volatility is especially relevant given the recent evidence documenting such secular increases in …rm-level volatility (even though aggregate sectoral volatility is declining). 3 We then empirically test the predictions of our model on the observed pattern of comparative advantage for a large sample of countries, using country-level export data at a detailed level of sector disaggregation (hundreds of sectors). 4 We thus test whether countries with relatively more ‡exible labor markets concentrate their exports relatively more intensively in sectors with higher volatility. We also test the additional prediction of our model that capital intensity reduces this e¤ect of volatility for countries with relatively more rigid labor markets. Naturally, we also control for other determinants of comparative advantage such as the interactions between country-level factor abundance and sector-level factor intensities. We use two distinct estimation approaches towards these goals. The …rst approach, in the spirit of Romalis (2004) , uses the full cross-section of commodity exports across countries and sectors to test for interaction e¤ects between the countrylevel and sector-level characteristics that jointly determine comparative advantage. 5 Recognizing some important limitations (both theoretical and empirical) associated with this method, we also use a second more robust approach based on a country-level analysis. Both approaches strongly con…rm our theoretical results.
The potential links between labor markets and comparative advantage have received an increasing level of attention in the recent trade literature. Saint-Paul (1997) analyzes the links between …ring costs and international specialization according to the life-cycle of goods: countries with ‡ex-ible labor markets exhibit a comparative advantage in 'new'industries subject to higher aggregate demand volatility than 'mature'industries. Davidson et al. (1999) present an equilibrium unemployment model in which the country with a more e¢ cient search technology has a comparative advantage in the good produced in high-unemployment/high-vacancy sectors. This is due to the di¤erences in prices required to induce factors to search for matches in sectors with di¤erent breakup rates. Galdón (2002) shows that labor market rigidities can also a¤ect specialization through long-term unemployment, which reduces the skills workers may need in 'new-economy'sectors. In the current paper, we focus on a relatively more tractable theoretical framework that lends itself to more direct empirical testing. In particular, we highlight the role of …rm-level volatility, which can be measured across sectors, in shaping the pattern of comparative advantage.
Our paper is also related to a growing literature that studies the e¤ects of international di¤er-ences in institutions on trade patterns. Levchenko (2004) shows that the quality of institutions (e.g., property rights, the quality of contract enforcement, shareholder protection) a¤ects both trade ‡ows and the distribution of the gains from trade between rich and poor countries. Costinot (2005) and Nunn (2005) extend models of trade with imperfect contracts, highlighting a link between country institutions (linked to contract enforcement) and the pattern of comparative advantage across sectors with di¤erent technological characteristics a¤ecting their reliance on contract enforcement (such as the complexity of production or the need for relation-speci…c investments by workers). Finally, our work is also linked to a number of papers that study the relationship between international trade and labor market outcomes in the presence of labor market rigidities. See, among others, the classic contributions by Brecher (1974a Brecher ( , 1974b , followed by the more recent contributions of Matusz (1996) , Davis (1998a Davis ( , 1998b , and Brügemann (2003) .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 formalizes the paper's basic insights in a one-factor model. Section 3 extends the model's implications for comparative advantage to a two-factor setup. In section 4, we present the empirical evidence. Section 5 concludes. An appendix discusses some analytical details.
The Model
There are two countries, denoted by c = F; H. Each country is endowed with L units of labor, which are supplied inelastically (for any positive wage) and internationally immobile. Preferences are identical across countries. Agents maximize utility over a Cobb-Douglas aggregate Q of a continuum of …nal goods q(i); indexed by i:
In each industry i; the …nal good is produced using a continuum of intermediate goods y(i; z) according to the technology
where y (i) denotes production of the …nal good i. We assume that these intermediate goods are
gross substitutes: " > 1 (and thus that the intermediate goods used to produce a given …nal good are less di¤erentiated than the …nal goods across industries). Each intermediate good is produced with labor only:
where is a stochastic term. Within each industry, the 0 s are iid draws from a common distribution G i (:), identical across countries, but di¤erent across industries, with mean 0 and variance 2 (i).
(We will sometimes refer to 2 (i) as industry i's 'volatility'.) This formulation emphasizes shocks for intermediate good producers on the production side, but allowing instead for demand shocks in equation (1) would yield results similar to the ones we discuss below. As a given realization of the productivity draw uniquely identi…es an intermediate good producer z, we now switch to the use of this draw as our index for the intermediate goods.
We assume two di¤erent institutional scenarios. In country F , all markets are competitive, and the determination of all prices and the allocation of all resources take place after the realization of . This captures the idea of a ‡exible economy that can reallocate resources towards their more e¢ cient uses costlessly. In country H, a wage is negotiated (e.g., by a labor union) and intermediate good producers then hire workers before the realization of ; no labor adjustment is allowed thereafter. This corresponds to the idea that rigidities prevent …rms from adjusting to changing circumstances. We assume that the unemployed, if any, cannot bid down the economywide ex-ante speci…ed wage, and that the intermediate good producer is contractually committed to paying the hired number of workers the negotiated wage (regardless of the realization of ).
After the realization of , production and commodity market clearing take place in a competitive setting, subject to the wage and employment restrictions. Intermediate goods producers anticipate this equilibrium, and adjust their contracted labor demand accordingly. Given ex-ante free entry into the intermediate goods sector, expected pro…ts of the intermediate good producers are driven to zero.
Throughout the paper, we do not explicitly model the potential bene…ts derived from employment stability nor the determination of the negotiated wage. We assume that the level of labor market rigidity is pre-determined at the time the wage w H is chosen. We then model the potential repercussions for aggregate employment L H , potentially leading to unemployment whenever L H < L ( ‡exible wages ensure full employment in the ‡exible economy, L F = L). We thus focus our analysis on the repercussion of these choices for the pattern of comparative advantage. Although the institutional di¤erences outlined above between the two countries are rather stark, we show in the appendix how our entire analysis can be extended to two countries with varying degrees of labor market ‡exibility. This degree of labor market ‡exibility can vary continuously between the extremes of the ‡exible and rigid economy described above.
Autarky in the Flexible Country
The zero-pro…t conditions for …nal good and intermediate good producers imply, respectively:
This yields
where~ 
Autarky in the Rigid Country
Notice that the law of large numbers ensures there is no aggregate uncertainty. This implies that expectations on all variables before the realization of equal their ex-post counterparts except for, of course, the individual …rm's realization. We assume that agents hold a diversi…ed portfolio and that …rms maximize expected pro…ts. Given that all …rms in industry i are ex-ante identical,
Ex-ante zero-pro…t conditions and market clearing imply
Equation (3) sets the price of …nal good i equal to its unit cost; equation (4) These equations yield
Parametrization of Productivity Draws
In order to simplify some of the ensuing analysis in an open-economy equilibrium, we parametrize the productivity draws to the normal distribution, thus assuming that (i) N 0; 2 (i) . Without loss of generality we assume that the industries are ranked in order of increasing volatility such that (i) is increasing in i. We further assume that (i) is di¤erentiable and positive. The average industry productivity levels can then be written as
2 ;
6 Despite the labor market rigidity, the labor market clears under autarky: the law of large numbers implies zero pro…ts at the industry level, pH (i) yH (i) = wH LH (i) 8i. The labor market clearing condition then yields
and holds for LH = L. The choice of wH proportionally shifts all prices pH (i) and has no e¤ect on employment. 7 This is a direct application of Jensen's inequality.
Free Trade
We assume free trade in …nal goods, but assume that intermediate goods remain non-traded.
Following, Dornbusch et al. (1977) , we de…ne the productivity di¤erential 8
As previously mentioned, labor market ‡exibility confers an absolute advantage to the ‡exible economy: A(i) 1: However, the labor market institutions also interact with industry volatility to engender a pattern of Ricardian comparative advantage: A(i) is decreasing in industry volatility 2 (i) (and hence A 0 (i) < 0). The productivity di¤erential between the ‡exible and rigid economy increases with industry volatility. This confers a comparative advantage to the ‡exible economy in high-volatility industries.
The free-trade equilibrium specialization pattern is characterized by the wage ratio w H =w F and a marginal commodity {. For i {, w H =w F A (i), and good i is produced by country
, and good i is produced by country F . In equilibrium, the value of world consumption must equal the value of world output, which equals world labor income:
where P denotes the price of Q. The value of country H's output, equal to country H's labor income, must also equal what the world spends on it. 9 If H produces in the range
where B 0 (i) > 0. In closing the model, we distinguish between two cases, which depend on the chosen level of w H relative to w F , and its consequences for unemployment in the rigid economy. We normalize w F = 1, and thus emphasize that the chosen wage level w H in the rigid economy is an indicator of worker purchasing power relative to the ‡exible economy. Recall that full employment prevails in the ‡exible economy, ensuring that L F = L is exogenously given. 8 Using the Normal parametrization for~ F (i) and~ H (i) in (7). 9 This condition is also equivalent to balanced trade. Expenditure on any interval
Full Employment in the Rigid Country
We …rst assume that w H is chosen in order to generate full employment, hence L H = L. 
Unemployment in the Rigid Country
We now assume that w H is chosen above its market-clearing level. Recall that country F 's labor market clears, so that L F = L. In this case, the condition w H = A ( {) determines the equilibrium specialization pattern:
, where B ( ) depends negatively on w H . It is easy to see that country H's employment level depends negatively on w H ,
Hence, free trade with a ‡exible economy imposes a trade-o¤ between the relative wage rate and unemployment in the rigid economy: as w H rises, the range of sectors in which country H is competitive shrinks due to foreign competition, and labor demand falls.
This implies that an increase in volatility across all industries will worsen the trade-o¤ between the relative wage w H and unemployment L L H . To see this more precisely, assume that volatility can vary in all industries by a proportional factor > 0. That is,
where 0 (i) denotes the new standard deviation of productivity shocks. In this case, w H = A ( {; ),
and @L H =@ < 0. An overall increase in volatility thus leads to higher unemployment levels at a given relative wage w H , or to decreases in the latter at a given employment level L H . In the appendix we allow for a varying degree of labor market ‡exibility in both countries, where a higher represents a more ‡exible labor market.
We show that increases in F H have e¤ects equivalent to those of an increase in .
A word of caution is needed here. We stress that these comparative statics involve the relative wage w H =w F , and not the real wage w H =P in the rigid economy. The standard gains from trade also apply to this model, so that trade improves welfare in both countries, and hence the real wage w H =P in the rigid economy. Overall increases in volatility also induce aggregate welfare gains as they induce absolute increases in productivity levels. Our analysis emphasizes that these gains are biased towards the ‡exible economy, improving relative welfare therein.
Two Factors
We now develop a two-factor version of our model. 10 We assume that countries are endowed with both capital and labor, and that industries di¤er in terms of capital intensity as well as volatility.
The Cobb-Douglas aggregate good Q is now de…ned according to
where an industry is now characterized by a pair (i; j) representing an index for both volatility (i) and capital intensity (j). The …nal good in each industry is still produced from a C.E.S. continuum of intermediate goods indexed by z:
Intermediate goods are now produced with both capital and labor, according to
In the appendix, we show that
where the numerator is the standard Cobb-Douglas unit cost function. The industry average productivity level~ F (i; j) is now given bỹ
Notice that for (j) = 0;~ F (i; j) is identical to the previously derived~ F (i) for the one-factor case.
As the capital intensity increases, the ability of the …nal good producer to reallocate expenditures across intermediate goods is reduced (since capital is assumed to be rigid), leading to decreases in average productivity.
Autarky in the Rigid Country
Since factor prices and the allocation of both factors are determined before the realization of , all intermediate good producers in an industry hire the same amount of capital and labor. The analysis here is an immediate extension of the one-factor rigid-country case:
where average productivity~ H (i; j) is now given bỹ
The Pattern of Comparative Advantage
Without loss of generality, we assume that (j) is an increasing and di¤erentiable function of j.
As in the one-factor case, we can de…ne
as the ratio of productivity levels for a given industry across the two countries. This ratio highlights, once again, the absolute productivity advantage of the ‡exible economy in all sectors: A(i; j) < 1; 8i; j. It also highlights how the pattern of comparative advantage varies with both volatility and capital intensity. @A(i; j)=@i < 0 as in the one factor case: the productivity advantage is larger in more volatile industries. However, @A(i; j)=@j > 0: holding volatility constant, this productivity advantage is reduced in relatively more capital intensive industries. This is intuitive, as a larger capital share reduces the ability of the ‡exible economy to take full advantage of the dispersion in productivity levels. 12 
Empirical Evidence Data Construction and Description

Country-Level Data
The key new country-level variable needed to test the predictions of our model is a measure of labor market rigidity across countries. Following the work of Botero et al. (2004) , the World Bank has collected such measures, which capture di¤erent dimensions of the rigidity of employment laws across countries. 13 These measures cover three broad employment areas: hiring costs, …ring costs, and restrictions on changing the number of working hours. The World Bank also produces a combined summary index for each country (weighing the measures in all areas). This variable is coded on a 100-point integer scale indicating increasing levels of rigidity. We subtract this variable from 100 to produce a measure of ‡exibility and use this as our main country labor market ‡exibility index, FLEX_c. (See Table 1 .) Unfortunately, historical data is not available, so we only have data for 2004. We will thus use the most recent data available from other sources to combine with this data.
Our remaining country level variables come from the Penn World Tables (PWT 6 .0 and 6.1). We measure capital abundance (K_c) as the physical capital stock per worker. Human skill abundance (S_c) is calculated as the average years of schooling in the total population from Barro and Lee (2000). 14 We also record data on real GDP (GDP_c) and real GDP per capita (GDPPC_c). All of 1 2 Needless to say, international factor price di¤erences will also a¤ect the pattern of comparative advantage. In our empirical work we attempt to control for the forces that drive these factor price di¤erences, so as to isolate the e¤ect of labor market ‡exibility on country specialization patterns via relative productivity di¤erences. 1 3 This data, along with more detailed descriptions on its collection, is available online at http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/HiringFiringWorkers/ 1 4 We also tried alternate measures of skill abundance, such as the fraction of workers that completed high school, or attained higher education (from Barro and Lee (2000) ). These measures were clearly dominated by the one based the above measures are available over time, up to 1996 (when data for some countries in our sample are then no longer available). We thus use the data for 1996 for all countries (and the Barro-Lee data for 1995). The GDP and capital stock variables are measured in 1996 international dollars.
When we combine these 2 sources of country-level data, we are left with 81 countries. However, we will most often restrict our analysis to countries with available GDP per capita levels above $2,000, leaving us with 61 countries. 15 Other countries are excluded from this sample because the Penn World Tables do not have capital stock data for them (most notably, for Germany and other countries that have recently split-up). 16 However, we will include these countries in our additional robustness checks with our country-level analysis.
Sector-Level Data
Our empirical approach also requires a measure of …rm-level volatility across sectors, as well as standard measures of factor intensities in production. This type of data is not available across our large sample of countries (at the needed detailed level of sectoral disaggregation), so we rely on the commonly used assumption that these needed measures are intrinsic to sectors and do not vary across countries. We therefore use a reference country, the US, to measure all these needed sector characteristics. Factor intensity data in manufacturing are available over time from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database at the 4-digit US SIC level (459 industrial sectors). For each sector, we measure capital intensity (K_s) as capital per worker and skill intensity (S_s) as the ratio of non-production wages to total wages. We have experimented with other formulations for these factor intensities, such as those based on the 3-factor model in Romalis (2004) , but found that the latter had much less explanatory power for the pattern of comparative advantage than our preferred measures. 17 Again, we use the most recent data available, but also average out the data across the latest 5 available years, 1992-1996, in order to smooth out any small yearly ‡uctuations on average years of schooling in explaining the pattern of comparative advantage across skill intensive sectors.
(especially for very small sectors). 18 All measures are also aggregated to the 3-digit SIC level (140 sectors).
Concerning …rm-level volatility, the appendix shows there is a direct relationship between the standard deviation of …rm-level shocks, (i), and the standard deviation of the growth rate of …rm sales (VOL_s). 19 We measure di¤erences in …rm-level volatility across sectors using COMPUSTAT data from Standard & Poor's. This data covers all publicly traded …rms in the US, and contains yearly sales and employment data since 1980 (the past 24 years). We use the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of …rm sales (measured as year-di¤erenced log sales) as our benchmark measure of …rm volatility. For robustness, we also compute a secondary measure of volatility as the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of sales per worker. Note that these volatility measures are purged of the mean growth rates of their respective reference variable (sales or sales per worker). Both of these volatility measures are highly correlated across …rms (.83 correlation ratio). 20 COMPUSTAT records the 4-digit SIC classi…cation for each …rm, although some …rms are only classi…ed into a 3-digit, and in rarer instances, into a 2-digit SIC classi…cations. As expected, the distribution of …rms across sectors is highly skewed. In order to obtain data on the largest possible number of sectors, we include in our analysis all …rms with at least 5 years of data (using all the data going back to 1980) and all sectors with at least 10 …rms. 21 However, we do not include any observation where the absolute value of the growth rate is above 300%. This leaves us with 5,216 …rms in our sample. Often, in these cases, there is only one dominant 4-digit sector within this 2-digit classi…cation. 22 We construct both a 4-digit and a 3-digit level measure of volatility. Whenever a volatility measure 1 8 These factor intensity measures are highly serially correlated (the average serial correlation is .99 for capital intensity and .97 for skill intensity), so this averaging does not substantially change any of our results. 1 9 The appendix also shows that rewriting the model in terms of VOL_s does not alter the model's comparative statics discussed above.
2 0 Below we only report the results obtained with the volatility measure based on sales. Results with the volatility measure based on sales per worker are quite similar. 2 1 We have also experimented with a more stringent requirement of 10 years of data and 20 …rms per sector. Our main results remain unchanged. 2 2 If COMPUSTAT only records a …rm's sector at the 2-or 3-digit level, then we use that …rm for the relevant classi…cation. We also aggregate all …rms with 4-digit level sector information into their respective 2-and 3-digit classi…cations.
is not available at the desired level of disaggregation, we use the measure from the next level of aggregation.
Country-Sector Exports
Instead of only measuring each country's exports into the US (as in Romalis (2004) and concord the remaining sectors to the US SIC classi…cation, we are left with 370 sectors. 23 Again, we wish to use the most recent data available, but also want to smooth the e¤ects of any year-toyear ‡uctuations in the distribution of exports across sectors (again, we are mostly concerned with smaller sectors where aggregate country exports can be more volatile). For this reason, we average exports over the last 10 years of available data, for 1991-2000. This yields our measure of aggregate exports, X sc , across sectors and countries. We also aggregate this variable to the 3-digit SIC level (134 distinct classi…cations are available).
Pooled Country-Sector Analysis
Our baseline speci…cation is:
+ kk (log K_s log K_c) + ss (log S_s log S_c) + s + c + " sc ;
where s and c are sector and country level …xed e¤ects. Given these …xed e¤ects, our speci…cation is equivalent to one where exports are measured as a share or as a ratio relative to the exports of a given reference country. Similarly, the speci…cation is also equivalent to one where the country 2 3 Since publicly available concordances from SITC rev.2 to US SIC do not indicate proportions on how individual SITC codes should be allocated to separate SIC codes, we construct our own concordance. We use export data for the US, that is recorded at the Harmonized System (HS) level (roughly 15,000 product codes). For each HS code, both an SITC and an SIC code is listed. We aggregate up the value of US exports over all HS codes for the last 10 available data years (1991-2000) across distinct SITC and SIC pairs. For each SITC code, we record the percentage of US exports across distinct SIC codes. We then concord exports for all countries from SITC to SIC codes using these percentage allocations. In most cases, this percentage is very high, so our use of US trade as a benchmark cannot induce any serious biases. For 50% of SITC codes, the percentage assigned to one SIC code is above 98%. For 75% of SITC codes, this percentage is above 76%. characteristics are measured as di¤erences relative to a reference country. All data measures (except for VOL_s) are entered in logs (VOL_s is a summary statistic of a logged variable).
Our model predicts vf > 0: countries with more ‡exible labor markets export relatively more in relatively more volatile sectors. 24 Additionally, our model predicts kf < 0: after controlling for the e¤ects of volatility across sectors, countries with less ‡exible labor markets export relatively more in relatively more capital intensive sectors (since the e¤ect of volatility is relatively less severe as capital intensity increases). The similar traditional comparative advantage predictions, based on factor abundance and factor intensity, are kk > 0 and ss > 0. Since our volatility measure is not uniformly available at the 4-digit SIC level, we test these predictions using both the data at the 4-digit level and 3-digit level. To ensure that our results are not dominated by low-income countries, we also include speci…cations where we exclude all countries with GDP per capita below $5,000 (leaving us with 42 countries with available capital stock data).
The results from the OLS regressions of equation (10) across the di¤erent data samples are listed in Table 5 . We …nd strong con…rmation both for the predictions of our model and the traditional forces of specialization according to comparative advantage. The table lists the standardized beta coe¢ cients, which capture the e¤ects of raising the independent variables by one standard deviation (measured in standard deviations of the dependent variable). The magnitude of the coe¢ cient on the volatility- ‡exibility interaction is of the same magnitude, though higher, than those reported by Nunn (2005) and Levchenko (2004) for the e¤ects of institutional quality on the pattern of comparative advantage. Table 5 shows that the level of sector disaggregation does not greatly in ‡uence the results, though the magnitude of the coe¢ cients are a little higher at the more aggregated 3-digit level. We thus continue our analysis using only the 3-digit level data.
Since the regressions in Table 5 do not include observations where no exports are recorded for a given country, the results should be interpreted as capturing the pattern of comparative advantage for countries across all of its export sectors -and not the e¤ect of comparative advantage on the country-level decision to export in particular sectors (which are likely a¤ected by other additional sector and country characteristics). We maintain this interpretation throughout our analysis, but also provide an additional robustness check in Table 6 , where the reported regressions have used all potential country-sector combinations: we add missing export observations with zero exports, then add 1 to all export values before taking logs. (Tobit speci…cations censored at zero yield extremely similar results to those reported in Table 6 .) This table shows that all our results remain strongly signi…cant, though the magnitude of most of the coe¢ cients drops substantially (this e¤ect is most pronounced for the skill intensity -skill abundance coe¢ cient, whereas the capital intensity -capital abundance coe¢ cient is mostly una¤ected).
We next con…rm that our results are not driven by other country and sector characteristics outside of our model. In recent work, Koren and Tenreyro (2005) have shown that increasing levels of economic development across countries are associated with a pattern of comparative advantage towards less volatile sectors -where this volatility is measured as the aggregate sector volatility of output per worker. We replicate their results by computing a similar measure of aggregate productivity volatility from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Productivity database. We measure the volatility of sector-level output per worker (VOLPROD_AGG_s) using the same methods as the …rm-level volatility measures: taking the standard deviation of its annual growth rate. We then add an additional control for the interaction between this measure of aggregate productivity volatility and development (measured as the log of GDP per capita). The results are reported in the …rst 2 columns of Table 7 . They show that a country's level of development is correlated with its pattern of comparative advantage across sectors with lower aggregate productivity volatility.
This e¤ect is very signi…cant and important when the low-income countries, with GDP per capita between $2,000 and $5,000, are included in the sample (the results for this added regressor are also substantially stronger at the 4-digit level for countries above the $5,000 GDP per capita threshold).
Nonetheless, the table also shows that our main results on the e¤ect of labor market ‡exibility on the pattern of comparative advantage remain una¤ected.
We next show that the driving force behind the e¤ect of volatility on the pattern of comparative advantage operates at the …rm-level and not at the sector-level. We construct a sector-level measure of sales volatility, VOL_AGG_s, following the same procedure as that outlined for aggregate productivity volatility (also using the NBER-CES Manufacturing data). We then interact this sector level variable with labor market ‡exibility and include it as an additional regressor.
The results, reported in the third and fourth columns of Table 7 , clearly show that this aggregate volatility has no measurable e¤ect on the pattern of comparative advantage. Lastly, we also add additional interactions between factor abundance (K_c and S_c) and VOL_s, as well as interactions between the level of development (again, the log of GDP per capita) and the other 3 sector-level measures (…rm-level volatility, and capital and skill intensity). These results are reported in the last 2 columns of Table 7 : once again, the coe¢ cients of interest remain roughly unaltered.
Country-Level Analysis
We now address some potential limitations in the pooled country-sector analysis by moving to a country-level analysis. Our main concern is that the previous results do not adequately re ‡ect the very skewed pattern of country exports across sectors -as they can be in ‡uenced by country-sector pairs with relatively very low exports. We are also concerned that our key measure of volatility is available at di¤erent levels of aggregation (representing di¤erent overall levels of economic activity).
To address these concerns, we construct a country average level of volatility: for each country, sector level volatility is averaged using its export share as a weight. Speci…cally, average country volatility VOL_c is obtained as
Thus, countries with higher export shares in more volatile sectors will have higher levels of this volatility average. This average also naturally handles the skewness of the distribution of country level exports by assigning larger weights to more important sectors. We use the 4-digit measure of volatility, as the averaging also naturally handles the di¤erent levels of aggregating, by essentially splitting o¤ sectors with available 4-digit volatility data into separate sectors, and keeping the other sectors grouped by their inherent level of disaggregation. We can thus test whether countries with more ‡exible labor markets have a comparative advantage in relatively more volatile sectors by examining the correlation across countries between VOL_c and FLEX_c. 25 We control for the in ‡uence of other comparative advantage forces in two separate ways. By introducing other country-level controls in a regression of VOL_c on FLEX_c; and alternatively by …rst purging the sector volatility measure VOL_s of any correlation with other relevant sector characteristics, and then looking at the direct correlation between the country level average of this purged volatility measure (VOL_PURGED_c) and FLEX_c. Table 8 reports the results corresponding to the regression of the un-purged country volatility average (VOL_c) on labor market ‡exibility, also including additional country controls (GDPPC_c, S_c, and log(K_c)). 26 2 5 One other advantage of this country-level method is that, unlike in the pooled country-sector analysis above, it does not require a monotonic response in a country's share of exports across sectors to detect a pattern of comparative advantage. 2 6 We introduce the capital stock per worker variable in logs, since it varies by an order of magnitude greater than for the other independent country-level variables. Entering this control in levels instead does not substantially change
The results show the strong independent contribution of labor market ‡exibility on the pattern of comparative advantage across sectors within di¤erent volatility levels.
Lastly, we turn to the second approach discussed above. We use all the previously used sector-level measures (K_s, S_s, VOL_AGG_s), as well as measures of the intensity of intermediate goods (material cost per worker) and energy use (energy spending per worker). We run an initial regression of VOL_s on all these sector level controls, and construct the residual as VOL_PURGED_s (its correlation coe¢ cient with VOL_s is .93). Table 9 reports the correlation coe¢ cients (which are also the standardized beta coe¢ cients) between VOL_PURGED_c and FLEX_c across di¤erent country samples, including the sample of all available countries (this last correlation is weighted by the log of real GDP across countries). As the table results clearly show, there is a very strong correlation between country-level ‡exibility and this average volatility, across all sub-samples of countries: all correlation coe¢ cients are signi…cant well beyond the 1% level. Figures 2-4 show the scatter plots for these relationships for di¤erent country samples.
Concluding Remarks
Comparative advantage can arise even when the genuine production capabilities (resources and technologies) of countries are identical, provided they di¤er in labor market institutions. Countries with more ‡exible labor markets should display a comparative advantage precisely where the ability to adjust is more important, that is, industries subject to high-variance shocks. The empirical evidence presented above supports the validity of our intuitions for a large sample of countries: more ‡exible countries have their exports biased towards high-variance industries.
This result has some interesting implications. First, labor market reform is likely to have asymmetric e¤ects across industries. Secondly, a rigid economy has an alternative to the liberalization of its labor market to improve its welfare: it can always liberalize trade and 'import ‡exibility'from a more ‡exible trading partner. Finally, an extension of the model might provide an additional explanation for the outsourcing phenomenon: production of intermediate goods may be relocated towards ‡exible labor markets as far as high-volatility industries are concerned.
the results. Notes: Beta coe¢ cients are reported. Country and sector dummies suppressed. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. * signi…cant at 10%; ** signi…cant at 5%; *** signi…cant at 1% 
Market clearing for each …rm's output y( ) and price p( ) implies
Firms hire labor until the value of its marginal product is equal to the common wage:
Equations (A.1), (A.2) and (A.3) yield
Equations (A.2) and (A.4) imply
Since labor is paid the value of its marginal product, the Cobb-Douglas production form (and zero pro…t condition) implies that each …rm pays a share (1 ) of its revenue p( )y( ) to labor:
This relationship also holds in the aggregate for the industry: wL = (1 ) py. As there are no ex-ante pro…ts, wages are determined so that aggregate capital cost rK equals the remaining share of revenue: implies that the price index for the …nal good is given by
Solving out for p(0) using equation (A.8) yields
One can think of our static set-up as a steady-state equilibrium: the law of large numbers ensures that aggregate outcomes are invariant over time, but the realizations of experienced by an individual …rm vary from period to period. Assume is iid over time. From equation (A.6), the growth rate of a …rm's sales between periods t and t 0 can be expressed as
The standard deviation of is therefore
The one-factor/ ‡exible-country counterpart to equation (A.9) can be obtained by assuming (j) = 0: vol F (i) = p 2 (" 1) (i). Assuming (j) = 1 yields the case of a one-factor model in which the factor is 'rigid': vol F (i) = p 2 (" 1) (i) =". In the two-factor/rigid-country case, we can think A-2 of the two rigid factors as combining into a composite rigid factor. The prediction for volatility is obviously the same in this case:
Not surprisingly, …rm sales in the rigid country vary less than in the ‡exible country, as …rms cannot adjust their employment in the rigid country.
B Three Factors
Assume now that countries use three factors in the production of intermediates: a 'rigid' factor, capital, a ' ‡exible'factor, materials, and labor. Industries di¤er in terms of factor intensities and volatility. The Cobb-Douglas aggregate good Q is now de…ned according to Q exp
where an industry is now characterized by a triple (i; j; m). The …nal good in each industry is still We assume that in both countries, the rental rate and the allocation of capital to intermediate good producers are determined prior to the realization of ; no adjustment is allowed thereafter.
Materials are instead allocated after the realization of in both countries.
where the industry average productivity level~ H (i; j; m) is now given bỹ H (i; j; m) = exp (" 1) 1 + [1 (m)] (" 1)
From the two-factor analysis above, we also know vol H (i; j; m) = p 2 (" 1) (i) 1 + [1 (m)] (" 1)
The Pattern of Comparative Advantage
Without loss of generality, we assume that (m) is an increasing and di¤erentiable function of m.
As in the one-factor and two-factor cases, we can de…ne Notice A(i; j; m) depends negatively on vol F . Concerning the e¤ect of factor intensities on A(i; j; m), 2 8 Assuming (m) = 0 8m brings us back to the two-factor case with 'rigid' capital of section 3.
(j) = 0 8j yields instead the two-factor case with the factor other than labor being ' ‡exible' in both countries. Finally, The sign of @ [ (j) ; (m)] =@ (j) is ambiguous. However, for average values of ; ; ", @ =@ < 0.
Hence, the comparative statics of A(i; j; m) does not change qualitatively when we reformulate it in terms of vol F .
C Degrees of Flexibility/Rigidity
A simple way of introducing di¤erent degrees of labor market ‡exibility/rigidity is to assume that each industry is comprised of both ‡exible and rigid sub-industries -henceforth sectors -and thus introducing one additional layer of aggregation into the model. For simplicity, we will work out the one-factor case. The extension to the many-factor case is immediate.
We maintain most of our assumptions from the main text. We now think of each industry i as an aggregate of nontraded sectors s:
y (i) = exp is the combined productivity average for industry i.
Free Trade
Assume F > H . De…ne
As in the one-factor model in the main text, the full-employment free-trade equilibrium can be characterized by the intersection of A (i) and B (i). Notice that an increase in F H will have e¤ects similar to a proportional increase in 2 (i) for all i. (In other words, F H operates like .)
Consider now the case with unemployment, and again normalize w F = 1. The condition w H = A ( {) still determines the equilibrium specialization pattern: { = { (w H ; F H ). Again, since
